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THE FORGOTTEN RIGHT OF FAIR USE 
Ned Snow† 
ABSTRACT 
 
Free speech was once an integral part of copyright law; today it is 
all but forgotten. At common law, principles of free speech protected 
those who expressed themselves by using another’s expression. Free 
speech determined whether speakers had infringed a copyright. To 
prevail on a copyright claim, then, a copyright holder would need to 
prove that the speaker’s use fell outside the scope of permissible 
speech—or in other words, that the use was not fair. Where 
uncertainty prevented that proof, fair use would protect speakers 
from the suppression of copyright. Today, however, all this has 
changed. Copyright has deeply buried any remnants of free speech, 
redefining the doctrine of fair use as a pretext for piracy that aims to 
excuse infringing conduct. Copyright enforcement has become the 
norm and fair use the exception, resulting in a presumption against 
fair-use speech. Uncertainty no longer protects speakers; it damns 
them. The change—from fair use as a strong right of speech to fair 
use as a weak excuse—occurred subtly, unintentionally, and without 
reason. It was a mistake. Quickly becoming widespread, the mistake 
swiftly eroded speech protections in copyright. If left unchecked, the 
mistake will become immutable. This Article traces the history of fair 
use from its birth as a strong right of speech to its deterioration into a 
weak excuse for infringement. 
                                                                                                                 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. The author 
expresses appreciation to professors Mark Lemley, Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Killenbeck, Michael 
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acknowledges the insightful comments provided by participants of the 2008 Works in Progress 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over a century, property rights of copyright holders were 
subject to speech rights of those who expressed themselves by 
repeating another’s expression.1 Through the doctrine of fair use, free 
speech offered presumptive protection to users of copyrighted 
material: copyright holders had to prove that a use was unfair to 
prevail on a claim of infringement.2 Today, speech rights of fair users 
are subject to property rights of copyright holders. Fair use stands as 
                                                                                                                 
1 See infra Part II.A (analyzing the history of fair use). 
2 See, e.g., Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (holding for defendant 
accused of copyright infringement on grounds that copyright holder, “on whom the burden of 
proof lies,” had failed to show that defendant’s use of copyrighted material amounted to 
infringement). 
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an exception to a copyright norm, available only in extraordinary 
circumstances:3 copyright holders prevail unless fair users can prove 
that their use merits protection.4 Thus, free speech once defined the 
scope of copyright; today, copyright defines the scope of free speech. 
This change in fair use, from a right of speech to an excuse for 
infringement, occurred subtly in the path of law. There was no clear 
and distinct alteration in course; there was no deliberate or intentional 
decision made.5 It was unintentional and accidental. Courts simply 
made a mistake. The speech-protective features of fair use are today 
all but forgotten as courts now view fair use as an exception to the 
norm of copyright monopoly. Simply put, where there is doubt as to 
whether a use is fair—which is always—courts refuse to apply fair 
use, for they view it as a doctrine that is exceptional, and its 
exceptionality suggests that circumstances requiring its application 
must be clear and apparent before it can be invoked.6 As a result, 
copyright’s interest in suppressing expression has ascended over free 
speech’s interest in building upon expression. Monopolies are 
prevailing. Speech is suffering. 
This Article traces the history of fair use from a speech right that 
defined the contours of copyright to an exception that excuses 
infringement. Part I outlines the doctrine of fair use and its role in 
alleviating the inherent tension between protecting free speech and 
creating incentives for original expression. Part I also explains the 
role of the conceptual and procedural framework for applying fair 
use. Part II recites the relevant history of fair use. It analyzes judicial 
treatment of fair use from its inception to its present application, 
pointing out the shift from viewing fair use as a right that defined 
copyright to an affirmative defense that excused infringement. Part II 
further recounts indications of congressional intent to make fair use a 
right; it then points out the Court’s faulty interpretation of those 
indications. Part III examines courts’ present treatment of fair use, 
analyzing specific cases that illustrate the substantive effect of 
changing the framework of fair use from a right to an excuse. 
                                                                                                                 
3 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal 
citations omitted) (“The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative 
defense.”); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo. 
2006) (refusing to recognize fair use based on fact that author never would have consented to 
use). 
4 See infra Part II.A–B (showing evolution of fair use from right to excuse). 
5 See infra Part II.B (discussing courts’ departure from precedent that treated fair use as a 
right). 
6 See infra Part III (discussing present treatment of fair use). 
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I. THE ROLE OF FAIR USE 
A. A Fundamental Conflict 
At war are free speech and copyright. The principle of free speech 
represents a limitation on the government’s ability to restrain 
expression.7 Copyright represents a government restraint on the 
public’s ability to communicate copied expression: it restrains those 
who speak expression already articulated by another.8 Copyright 
condones that restraint; free speech condemns it. 
From the inception of fair use, the purpose of the fair-use doctrine 
has been to alleviate the tension between copyright and free speech.9 
Simply put, its ostensible purpose is to reconcile the respective 
speech-suppressive and speech-protective positions. It is intended to 
exempt from copyright that which merits protection as speech.10 If 
subsequent expression incorporates another’s prior expression in 
order to communicate an original idea, that subsequent expression 
constitutes a fair use of the prior expression, and so the law should 
protect it as speech.11 Fair use, then, is intended to calm the strife 
between copyright and free speech by delineating core speech that 
copyright cannot suppress.12 
Over time, courts developed general principles to determine 
whether a use of copyrighted expression was permissibly fair.13 
Today, the Copyright Act states some of those principles in a list of 
four factors that courts must consider in determining fairness.14 The 
first factor examines whether the use is transformative and whether 
the use serves a commercial purpose; the second factor examines 
whether the nature of the copyrighted work merits strong protection; 
the third factor examines whether the use constitutes a significant 
                                                                                                                 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
8 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 504 (2006) (endowing copyright holders with 
exclusive rights over original expression and imposing penalties on persons who violate those 
rights). 
9 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (recognizing fair use as an exception to copyright 
infringement); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 n.24 (2003) (describing fair use as a 
free speech safeguard and a First Amendment accommodation); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 
344, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (articulating principles of fair use). 
10 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20 (discussing copyright law’s “built-in First Amendment 
accommodations”).  
11 See id. at 220 (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“The fair use defense affords 
considerable latitude for scholarship and comment . . . and even for parody . . . .”). 
12 See infra Part II.B (discussing fair use as an affirmative defense). 
13 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3–26 (2d ed. 
1995) (tracing the history of fair use). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (2006); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 577 (1994) (applying the fair-use factors). 
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amount or a substantial portion of the copyrighted work; and the 
fourth factor examines whether the use significantly affects the value 
of, or a potential market for, the copyrighted work.15 
The application of these factors to circumstances often raises 
difficulty for decision makers.16 Consider the first-factor inquiry into 
whether a use transforms a copyrighted work. Does a trivia game 
about the popular television show, Seinfeld, transform the expression 
in that show?17 Does a painting of a copyrighted photograph 
transform that photograph—e.g., Shepard Fairey’s painting of the 
Associated Press photograph of President Obama?18 Transformation, 
which is a question of degree and which often weighs heavily in a 
court’s fair-use analysis, may be too far buried in grey for a court to 
discern its presence with absolute clarity. Determining fairness 
requires a fact-finder to draw upon subjective experience and opinion, 
which makes predicting the outcome exceedingly difficult.19  
Of course not every assertion of fair use raises uncertainty. Some 
infringers may assert the argument where it is not even arguable.20 In 
such cases of blatant infringement, courts can easily dismiss bad-faith 
arguments of fair use.21 But for those cases where fair use is at least 
arguable, courts and scholars alike recognize the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding the question.22 
                                                                                                                 
15 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4). 
16 See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1106–07 
(1990) (“Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. . . . Decisions are not 
governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to individual 
fact patterns.”). 
17 See Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (discussing that situation and concluding that the defendant trivia producer’s use of 
Seinfeld was not a fair use), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1998). 
18 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 1:09–
CV–01123–AKH (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009), ECF No. 1 (arguing that Fairey’s painting was 
transformative). 
19 See Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on 
Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 497–501 (2010) (“Because fair use is a 
flexible doctrine, lacking a precise definition, it is an inherently vague and indeterminate 
doctrine.”). 
20 See id. (“[T]he indeterminacy of fair use requires that the judge or juror who draws the 
fair use inferences inject her own view of what should be considered fair.”). 
21 See id. at 498–99 n.90 (discussing a situation in which the defendant makes a 
commercial use of a copied expression, which does not require any inferences). 
22 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (requiring fair 
use determinations to be made on a “case-by-case” basis); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 
F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[T]he issue of fair use . . . is the most troublesome in the whole 
law of copyright.”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) 
(Story, J.) (describing application of fair use as “the metaphysics of the law”); Michael J. 
Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 391, 402 (2005) (“The substantive emptiness of fair use makes it something of a dumping 
ground for copyright analysis that courts can’t manage in other areas.”); Gideon Parchomovsky 
& Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (2007) (“[S]cholars 
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The reason for the uncertainty that surrounds questions of fair use 
is that the doctrine is intended to contemplate all circumstances that 
could possibly justify protecting a use from copyright’s suppression.23 
Fair use must be as flexible as circumstances are variant that would 
occasion its application. It is for this reason that fair use requires a 
case-by-case analysis.24 Flexibility yields uncertainty in meaning, 
including the terms intended to offer clarity, e.g., transformation, 
substantial, commercial, and potential market. Uncertainty, then, is 
unavoidable—indeed, even intentional—in the doctrine of fair use, 
for uncertainty allows flexibility and a breadth of application. 
B. A Dispositive Framework 
Amidst uncertainty, presumption becomes dispositive. In the 
absence of clarity on a substantive question, a decision maker will 
favor the litigant whom the law presumes to be the winner.25 So the 
uncertainty that accompanies fair-use questions increases the 
importance of the presumption that governs.26 The presumption turns 
on the substantive view of fair use: fair use may be viewed as either a 
speech right that is superior to the copyright right or as an exception 
that excuses infringing conduct.27 The former conception implies a 
presumption favoring fairness: as a right of speech, fair use would 
require that a copyright holder prove that the speech is not protected, 
i.e., that fair use should not apply. By contrast, the latter conception 
implies a presumption favoring copyright: as an excuse for 
                                                                                                                 
 
generally agree that it is now virtually impossible to predict the outcome of fair use cases.”); R. 
Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 423, 426 (2005) (“[T]here is little more that can be usefully said about the division 
between fair and unfair uses in practice: The ‘know it when you see it’ nature of the analytic 
approach in this context simply precludes such observations.”). 
23 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (internal citation and quotations omitted) (“The fair use 
doctrine . . . permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, 
on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.”). 
24 See id. (citation omitted) (“[T]he statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-
by-case analysis.”). 
25 See e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 1998) (“On 
balance, we think the fourth factor is a very close question. . . . [C]onsidering that [the user] 
bears the burden of showing an absence of ‘usurpation’ harm to [the party holding the 
copyright], believe that it tips toward [the party holding the copyright].”). 
26 This conclusion turns on the premise that issues of fair use are factual and subject to 
burden-of-proof presumptions. See Snow, supra note 19, at 497–506 (concluding that fair-use 
issues must be treated as factual). 
27 Compare Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 
2001) (noting in dicta that “fair use should be considered an affirmative right” but declining to 
treat it that way given a Supreme Court declaration that it is an affirmative defense), with 
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[F]air use 
excuses otherwise actionable infringement.”). 
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infringement, fair use would be an exception that justifies infringing 
conduct, i.e., the proponent must prove that it does apply. The 
substantive view of fair use—as a right of speech or as an exceptional 
excuse—determines the presumption. And that presumption provides 
a significant substantive advantage to whichever party it favors. 
For over a century, the framework for viewing the role of fair use 
remained constant.28 Fair use represented those principles for 
identifying speech that copyright could not suppress. In effect, it 
represented the superior right of speech over the inferior right of 
copyright. Accordingly, a burden to prove unfair use rested with 
copyright holders to prevail on a claim for infringement.29 In recent 
years, however, the framework has shifted. Fair use now represents an 
excuse to justify infringement, or in other words, an exception to the 
norm of speech suppression through copyright.30 And as an exception 
to copyright, fair use does not apply unless demonstrated. Fair users 
must now prove that their use is fair before the law will protect them 
from copyright.  
An irony of this shift in the fair-use framework is that the 
uncertainty that originally strengthened the speech-protective function 
of fair use now weakens it. Under the framework of a right of speech, 
fair use drew upon uncertainty to be flexible and broad; uncertainty 
impeded copyright’s rush to suppress expression. Courts were 
reluctant to enjoin a person from repeating expression if they were 
uncertain whether the repetition constituted a fair or unfair use.31 
Now, however, the framework of treating fair use as an exception to 
the norm of copyright has turned the role of uncertainty in fair use 
entirely upside down. Under the present framework, circumstances of 
fairness must be apparent and obvious for the doctrine to apply, so 
infringement is not excused where ambiguity and uncertainty exist.32 
Where a fair-use argument creates more questions than answers, it 
must fail. Thus, the shift in the fair-use framework has changed the 
role of uncertainty from protecting fair users to punishing them. 
II. THE HISTORY OF FAIR USE: FROM RIGHT TO EXCUSE 
From its inception, courts treated the fair-use doctrine as a right of 
speech, but modern courts have departed from this position. And 
despite Congress’s attempt to return the doctrine to its original status, 
                                                                                                                 
28 See infra Part II (discussing history of fair use). 
29 See infra Part II (analyzing burdens of proof in fair use). 
30 See infra Part III (interpreting modern day treatment of fair use). 
31 See infra Part II (comparing courts’ prior treatment of fair use). 
32 See infra Part III (explaining the modern day approach to fair use). 
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the Supreme Court ultimately settled the issue against fair users. This 
Part recounts this history.  
A. Judicial Treatment of Fair Use as a Right 
1. English Case Law 
Early fair-use jurisprudence recognized that fair use was a right 
that competed with the claim of copyright. Before fair use was 
introduced in the United States, English common law contemplated 
the doctrine.33 Those early English cases described principles of fair 
use as defining infringement, or in other words, they describe those 
principles as defining the scope of the copyright holder’s rights. By 
defining the scope of the copyright holder’s rights, fair use 
represented that which was outside the scope of rights held by the 
copyright holder.  
Examples are apparent of early English courts treating fair use in 
this manner.34 In Dodsley v. Kinnersley,35 the defendant-user had 
printed one-tenth of Samuel Johnson’s fictional work, The Prince of 
Abyssinia.36 The court contemplated whether this use constituted a 
fair abridgment: 
I shall determine this case upon the next question, which is, 
Whether there has been any infringement of property? . . . It 
was insisted for the defendant, that what was printed in the 
Magazine was a fair abridgment, and, as such, not a piracy. 
No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair abridgment; 
but every case must depend on its own circumstances.37 
                                                                                                                 
33 See PATRY, supra note 13, at 3–26 (tracing the English common law roots of the 
modern fair-use doctrine). 
34 The first recorded decision that articulates principles of fair use arose in Gyles v. 
Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (Ch.). There, the defendant used portions of the copyright 
holder’s work to create a legal treatise. Id. In contemplating the copyright holder’s plea for an 
injunction, the court described abridgements: 
Where books are colourably shortened only, they are undoubtedly within the meaning of 
the act of Parliament, and are a mere evasion of the statute, and cannot be called an abridgment. 
But this must not be carried so far as to restrain persons from making a real and fair abridgment, 
for abridgments may with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper and 
print, but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in them, and in many 
cases are extremely useful, though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the 
sense of an author. 
Id. at 490. Recognizing that a fair abridgement might be prejudicial against the original 
author, the court suggested that the fair abridgment would not lie “within the meaning of the act 
of Parliament,” implying that the court viewed the fair abridgment as lying outside the scope of 
copyright. Id.  
35 (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.). 
36 Id. at 270–71. 
37 Id. at 271. 
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Defining infringement in terms of whether the use constituted a fair 
abridgment, the court held that the defendant’s use was fair.38  
In Cary v. Kearsley,39 the defendant-user had employed the 
copyright holder’s book of maps to create his own.40 Contemplating 
whether the user had committed a piracy, the court stated: 
That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not 
of itself piracy, or sufficient to support an action; a man may 
fairly adopt part of the work of another: he may so make use 
of another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the 
benefit of the public: but having done so, the question will be, 
Was the matter so taken used fairly with that view, and 
without what I may term animus furandi?41 
This explanation demonstrates that the court viewed the issue of 
whether the user had fairly used the copyright holder’s material as 
dispositive to the question of infringement. Specifically, that issue 
determined whether the user had committed a piracy, or in other 
words, whether the facts supported an action.42 After this explanation, 
the copyright holder wisely dismissed his action voluntarily.43 
Early English case law thus treated fair-use principles as 
determinative of whether infringement had occurred, which meant 
that fair use defined the scope of the copyright holder’s rights.44 A 
result of this treatment was that uncertainty surrounding whether a 
use was fair favored the defendant-user. Because a copyright holder 
bore the burden to demonstrate infringement, the copyright holder 
was required to show that the defendant’s use was unfair. So if a court 
could not determine whether a use was fair or unfair, the court would 
rule that the copyright holder had not fulfilled his burden to show 
infringement. In short, doubt as to whether the use was fair would 
result in the court allowing the use. An example of this occurs in 
Murray v. Bogue.45 There, the defendant-user had published travelers’ 
guides based on the copyright holder’s copyrighted work.46 In 
                                                                                                                 
38 Id. at 272. 
39 (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (K.B.). 
40 Id. at 679–80. 
41 Id. at 680.  
42 See id. (“That part of the work of one author is found in another, is not itself piracy, or 
sufficient to support an action.”). 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163, 165 (Ch.) (“The question upon the 
whole is, whether this is a legitimate use of the Plaintiff’s publication in the fair exercise of a 
mental operation, deserving the character of an original work.”). 
45 (1852) 61 Eng. Rep. 487 (Ch.).  
46 Id. at 493. 
 11/15/2011 4:54:22 PM 
144 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1 
refusing the copyright holder’s bill for an injunction, the court 
commented: 
I have felt great difficulty in coming to a conclusion whether . 
. . the use of the Plaintiff’s materials and the benefit derived 
from his work by the Defendant, direct or indirectly, amount 
to such an extraction from it as comes up to an extraction of 
the vital part; whether it comes up to an unfair use, or is only 
a fair use of it. . . . On the whole, my conclusion is that I 
cannot say that the Defendant in his work makes an unfair use 
of the Plaintiff’s. I am not absolutely satisfied that the use 
made of it might not by another Judge be looked at in a 
different light; but I cannot satisfy my mind that there is that 
unfair use which would justify me in restraining the 
publication of the Defendant’s work.47 
Repeatedly portraying the ultimate issue as whether the defendant-
user made an unfair use, the Murray court here expressed its 
uncertainty on whether it should conclude that the use was fair or 
unfair. The court further admitted the possibility that a different judge 
might believe the use to be unfair, but this judge could not satisfy his 
mind that there had been an unfair use.48 Uncertainty, then, compelled 
the court to rule for the user.49 
2. Federal Case Law 
Principles of fair use developed in the United States based on the 
English common law. Like their English counterparts, courts in the 
U.S. treated the principles of fair use as definitional to the issue of 
infringement: fair-use principles determined whether a copyright 
holder’s rights had been invaded, or in other words, they determined 
the scope of a copyright holder’s rights.50 As definitional to 
infringement, fair use implied that the user held a presumptive right to 
use the copyrighted expression absent a showing otherwise.51 The 
subsections below describe this treatment.  
                                                                                                                 
47 Id. (second emphasis added). 
48 See id. (“I am not absolutely satisfied that the use made of [plaintiff’s work] might not 
by another Judge be looked at in a different light.”). 
49 See id. (holding that the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s work was not unfair). 
50 See infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing early American courts’ use of fair-use principles as 
determinative of infringement). 
51 See infra Part II.A.2.b (discussing early American courts’ presumption of a general 
privilege held by subsequent users to make use of a work, and copyright limiting that right). 
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a) Fair Use as a Test for Infringement 
Archetypal fair-use law well establishes that courts treated 
principles of fair use as determining the issue of infringement. The 
first American case to articulate the principles of fair use, Folsom v. 
Marsh, 52 exemplifies this treatment.53 There, Justice Joseph Story 
considered whether a defendant-user had infringed the copyright 
holder’s rights in letters from President George Washington when the 
user employed them in a historical work.54 While analyzing whether 
the user had infringed the copyright holder’s work, Justice Story 
articulated principles that today constitute the four statutory factors of 
fair use.55  
In articulating these principles, it is clear that Justice Story treated 
them as determining infringement. He framed the “question of 
piracy” regarding “what constitutes an infringement” as depending 
on, among other things, “a nice balance of the comparative use made 
in one of the materials of the other; [and] the nature, extent, and value 
of the materials thus used,”56 citing a critical review as an example of 
a permissible use.57 Later in the opinion, Justice Story succinctly 
stated the question that the facts presented as follows: “The question, 
then, is, whether this is a justifiable use of the original materials, such 
as the law recognizes as no infringement of the copyright of the 
plaintiffs.”58 To answer that question, he explained:  
                                                                                                                 
52 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).  
53 See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 431–
32 (1998) (arguing that a misunderstanding of Folsom v. Marsh is that it “created fair use, when 
in fact it merely redefined infringement”). 
54 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 345 (describing “more than one third” of defendant-user’s 
work as containing the letters of George Washington). 
55 See id. at 344, 348 (“[T]he question of piracy, often depend[s] upon a nice balance of 
the comparative use made in one of the materials of the other. . . . In short, we must often, in 
deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the 
quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, 
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”); see also Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (crediting Justice Story’s articulation of fair 
use as the basis for the modern doctrine as codified in the 1976 Copyright Act). 
56 Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344. This quotation reflects the Copyright Act’s articulation of fair 
use: the Act cites criticism as an example of fair use; the first factor balances the comparative 
uses by examining the purpose of the use; the second factor examines the nature of the 
copyrighted work; and the third examines the extent of the work that was used. See 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006) (setting forth the statutory factors of a fair-use defense). 
57 See Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344 (“[N]o one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite 
largely from the original work . . . for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism.”). As an 
opposing example, he cited a review that quoted from an original work simply to substitute for 
the work, reflecting the first fair-use factor’s examination of the purpose and character of the 
use. Compare id. at 344–45 (citing a review that quotes from an original work simply to 
substitute or supersede the original work), with 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (examining the purpose and 
character of the use). 
58 Folsom, 9 F. Cas at 348. 
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[W]e must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and 
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use 
may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede 
the objects, of the original work.59 
For Justice Story, then, determining whether the law would 
recognize the use as infringing turns on inquiries that today constitute 
the doctrine of fair use—here, specifically, the amount and 
substantiality of the amount taken and the market impact. Throughout 
Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story set forth principles that guide today’s 
fair-use doctrine as inquiries that determine infringement.60  
Justice Story’s portrayal of fair-use principles as determining 
infringement is not limited to Folsom v. Marsh. In Gray v. Russell,61 
he articulated the same principles, framing the ultimate question that 
those principles determined as: “what amounts to a piracy of a 
work?”62 Examples of uses that turned this piracy inquiry into “a very 
nice question,” Justice Story explained, included copying another’s 
expression for purposes of writing a critical review or creating an 
abridgement.63 These examples required “various considerations,” 
                                                                                                                 
59 Id. at 348. 
60 Further language from Folsom demonstrates Justice Story treating principles of fair use 
as determinative of infringements:  
If so much is taken, that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors 
of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another, 
that is sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro tanto. . . . In some cases, a 
considerable portion of the materials of the original work may be fused, if I may use 
such an expression, into another work, so as to be undistinguishable in the mass of 
the latter, which has other professed and obvious objects, and cannot fairly be 
treated as a piracy; or they may be inserted as a sort of distinct and mosaic work, 
into the general texture of the second work, and constitute the peculiar excellence 
thereof, and then it may be a clear piracy. 
Id. (emphases added). 
61 10 F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728). 
62 Id. at 1038. Justice Story articulated the principles in Gray v. Russell as follows: 
In some cases, indeed, it may be a very nice question, what amounts to a piracy of a 
work, or not. Thus, if large extracts are made therefrom in a review, it might be a 
question, whether those extracts were designed bonâ fide for the mere purpose of 
criticism, or were designed to supersede the original work under the pretence of a 
review, by giving its substance in a fugitive form. The same difficulty may arise in 
relation to an abridgment of an original work. The question, in such a case, must be 
compounded of various considerations; whether it be a bonâ fide abridgment, or only 
an evasion by the omission of some unimportant parts; whether it will, in its present 
form, prejudice or supersede the original work; whether it will be adapted to the 
same class of readers; and many other considerations of the same sort, which may 
enter as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a piracy, or not. 
Id. 
63 Id. 
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such as whether the use superseded the original work, was adapted to 
the same set of readers, omitted only unimportant parts—all of which 
“may enter as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a 
piracy, or not.”64 Thus, according to Justice Story, principles of fair 
use constituted “elements” of the copyright holder’s claim.65 
Also noteworthy about Justice Story’s explanations is that he never 
identified the principles of fair use as a doctrine distinct from the 
infringement inquiry. Never once did he even employ the term fair 
use. Not until decades later did the term “fair use” develop as a 
descriptor of the principles that Story had set forth.66 For Story, then, 
the principles of fair use did not represent a doctrine independent 
from the question of infringement that would merit a distinct label; 
those principles were part and parcel with the criteria for determining 
infringement.  
This view is further exemplified in Story’s treatise on equity 
jurisprudence, where he explained: “If there has been [a legitimate 
use of the copyright], although it may be prejudicial to the original 
author, it is not an invasion of his legal rights.”67 Determining 
whether a use is legitimate, then, determines whether a copyright 
holder’s rights have been invaded. To be sure, Story viewed a fair use 
as a use not contemplated by the legal rights of the copyright holder. 
According to Story, then, principles of fair use delineated the 
contours of infringement; they determined whether a user had invaded 
the copyright holder’s right. Those principles did not simply excuse 
infringing conduct; they were not like the defenses of consent, 
expired limitations, or necessity in that they did not represent an 
exception to copyright. Rather, the principles represented the basis for 
determining the scope of copyright.68 Story viewed the principles of 
fair use not as subject to the right of copyright, but rather as 
definitional to the right of copyright.69  
                                                                                                                 
64 Id. 
65 See id. (stating that considerations parallel to those of the fair-use doctrine “may enter 
as elements, in ascertaining, whether there has been a piracy”). 
66 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 44 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (using the 
term “fair use”). 
67 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 1269, at 617–18 (14th ed. 1918). 
68 Were fair use like the affirmative defenses listed above, then the principles of fair use 
articulated in Folsom would have been mere dicta to Justice Story’s holding, for he found that 
the defendant had infringed. Yet most assuredly the principles of fair use in Folsom are not 
dicta: they represent the principles under which he found infringement. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 
F. Cas. 342, 348–49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (relying on principles akin to the fair-use 
doctrine in finding that defendant-user infringed on plaintiff’s copyright). 
69 See, e.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) 
(Story, J.) (emphasis added) (“[T]o amount to an infringement, it is not necessary that there 
should be a complete copy or imitation in use throughout; but only that there should be an 
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Like Justice Story, the other early American jurists that articulated 
the fair-use doctrine treated it as definitional to infringement.70 For 
instance, in Story v. Holcombe,71 the court described the inquiry into 
“[t]he infringement of a copyright” as a qualitative assessment into 
the user’s copying, with the ultimate question turning on whether the 
use has superseded the original work.72 Quoting Justice Story, the 
court repeated the view that “a fair and bona fide abridgment of an 
original work, is not a piracy of the copyright of the author.”73 The 
court therefore viewed fair abridgments as lying outside the scope of 
uses granted to the author in copyright. Interestingly, the court noted 
that it would have preferred that the common law had adopted a 
stricter doctrine of infringement rather than the liberal doctrine stated 
in fair use, yet the court nevertheless applied those fair-use principles, 
thereby indicating the strength of those principles in relation to 
copyright: they apparently were not applied at the mere discretion of 
                                                                                                                 
 
important and valuable portion which operates injuriously to the copy-right of the plaintiff.”). 
70 See, e.g., Falk v. Donaldson, 57 F. 32, 35 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) (relying on Folsom to 
describe the question of fair use as: “[T]o what is the artist or author entitled as his conception, 
and what of such original conception has been appropriated?”); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494, 
496 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (“It is not only quantity, but value and quality, that are to be 
regarded in determining the question of piracy.”); Chapman v. Ferry, 18 F. 539, 541 (C.C.D. Or. 
1883) (relying on Folsom for the proposition that “[q]uestions of infringement of copyright are 
often very difficult to decide.”); Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 60 (summarizing principles of fair use 
in Folsom as determining what “constitute[s] an invasion of copyright”); Greene v. Bishop, 10 
F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (“Great difficulties oftentimes surround the 
inquiry, whether an alleged act of copying from an original author amounts to piracy, or whether 
it may or may not be justified on the ground of fair quotation, or that the use made of the book 
or its contents does not exceed what the law permits to another engaged in composing a new 
work upon the same subject.”).  
71 23 F. Cas. 171 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497). 
72 Id. at 173 (“[T]his privilege can not be so exercised as to supersede the original book.”). 
That the court viewed principles of fair use as determinative of infringement, rather than as an 
excuse for infringement, is apparent from the following:  
[T]he special master comes to the conclusion that there is no infringement; but that 
the work of Holcombe is a fair abridgment . . . . The infringement of a copyright 
does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts as upon their value. If they 
embody the spirit and the force of the work in a few pages, they take from it that in 
which its chief value consists. This may be done to a reasonable extent by a 
reviewer, whose object is to show the merit or demerit of the work. But this privilege 
can not be so exercised as to supersede the original book. . . . The inquiry is, what 
effect must the extracts have upon the original work. If they render it less valuable 
by superseding its use, in any degree, the right of the author is infringed: and it can 
be of no importance to know with what intent this was done. 
Id. at 172–73. 
73 Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)). 
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the court; rather, the principles of fair use represented the defining 
line of copyright that the law required courts to apply.74 
b) Fair Use as a Right 
Consistent with the view that infringement requires unfair use is 
the view that use of another’s expression constitutes the norm and 
suppression of that use through copyright constitutes the exception. 
The eminent case of Lawrence v. Dana75 is illustrative. In Lawrence, 
the copyright holder had published a legal treatise that included 
extensive annotations; the user-defendant later published an edition of 
the same work in which he allegedly copied these annotations.76 The 
court held that the use was not fair, explaining fair use as a more 
general privilege of the user:  
None of these rules of [copyright] decision are inconsistent 
with the privilege of a subsequent writer to make what is 
called a fair use of a prior publication; but their effect 
undoubtedly is, to limit that privilege so that it shall not be 
exercised to an extent to work substantial injury to the 
property which is under the legal protection of copyright.77 
The Lawrence court thus viewed subsequent authors as holding a 
privilege to exercise fair use and copyright holders as limiting that 
privilege.78 Privilege here means an immunity that the law grants to a 
specific class of persons, namely, to creators of expression.79 Merely 
by being an author does a person enjoy a general privilege that 
exempts her from legal liability for her writings—so the court 
taught.80 This privilege, the court pointed out, is not absolute: 
copyright limits the privilege where the subsequent expression 
supersedes the original author’s work, substantially injuring the 
                                                                                                                 
74 See id. (“[I]n this country the [fair-use] doctrine has prevailed. I am, therefore, bound 
by precedent; and I yield to it in this instance, more as a principle of law, than a rule of reason or 
justice.”).  
75 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136). 
76 Id. at 31–32. 
77 Id. at 61. 
78 See id. (discussing the interplay between fair use and infringement).  
79 See id. (“[C]ases frequently arise in which, though there is some injury, yet equity will 
not interpose by injunction to prevent the further use . . . .”); see also generally THOMAS 
WALTER WILLIAMS, A COMPENDIOUS AND COMPREHENSIVE LAW DICTIONARY (1816) 
(unpaginated) (defining privilege to be “either personal or real,” with a “personal privilege” 
meaning “that which is granted to any person, either against or beyond the course of the 
common law: as, for example, a member of parliament may not be arrested”). 
80 See Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 61 (speaking generally about the “privilege of a subsequent 
writer to make what is called a fair use of a prior publication”). 
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original author.81 Stated another way, copyright limits the general 
privilege to its core—fair use. Key is that copyright limits the 
privilege, rather than the privilege limiting copyright. According to 
Lawrence, then, fair use does not exist as an exception to copyright, 
but rather, copyright exists as an exception to fair use. 
An early copyright treatise further indicates this relationship 
between copyright and fair use. In his influential copyright treatise, 
George Ticknor Curtis expressly labeled fair use as a “right.”82 Curtis 
explained that in view of the right of fair use, the inquiry into 
copyright infringement must first  
assum[e] the general principle, that every writer is at liberty 
to treat of any subject whatever, whether it has been 
previously written upon by others or not; and then [that 
inquiry] resolves itself into the question . . . whether he has 
made a lawful use of the particular work which he is alleged 
to have infringed.83  
This excerpt suggests that Curtis viewed the general right of speech in 
every author as foundational to the inquiry into whether a user had 
infringed copyright. The general right constitutes the norm. Only after 
recognizing that general right does the inquiry turn to whether the 
speech by the subsequent author is unlawful, or in other words, 
whether the use infringes copyright. According to Curtis, then, the 
right of authors to create and speak is the norm and copyright’s 
suppression of that right is the limitation, or exception, to that right.  
c) Fair Use as a Presumption 
Viewing copyright as an exception to a subsequent author’s 
general right to speak suggests a presumption in favor of fair use. If 
the norm is speech and the exception is suppression, then it would 
seem that the proponent of the exception, copyright holders, must 
                                                                                                                 
81 See id. (“[T]he privilege of fair use accorded to a subsequent writer must be such, and 
such only, as will not cause substantial injury to the proprietor of the first publication.”). 
82 GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 237 (1847). Mr. 
Curtis stated:  
To administer the law in such a manner as not to curtail the fair use of existing 
materials, in any department of letters, is one of the great tasks of jurisprudence. It 
proposes to itself, first, the vindication of rights acquired by genius, discovery, 
invention, and labor, in the productions of the mind; secondly, the acknowledgment 
upon motives of public policy, of the right to a fair use by any writer of all that has 
been recorded by previous authors. 
Id. 
83 Id. at 254. 
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prove that the exception applies; otherwise the use is presumptively 
fair. Stated differently, as a test for infringement, the principles of fair 
use require the litigant bearing the burden to prove infringement—the 
copyright holder—to incorporate those principles in satisfying that 
burden. The early view of fair use, then, suggests a presumption of 
fair use, and this would have required copyright holders to prove that 
the use was not fair, or in other words, that the use was unfair.84 
On this point, Lawrence v. Dana is again instructive.85 The 
Lawrence court explained the issue of determining “an invasion of 
copyright” (or in other words, determining infringement) by reciting 
Justice Story’s articulation of the fair-use doctrine.86 Stating this same 
issue of infringement “in brief terms,” the court formulated it as 
follows: “was that use allowable, or was it of a character and to such 
an extent that it infringed the complainant’s rights?”87 The word 
allowable here turns on whether the use was fair, for the defendant-
user was arguing that his use was “allowable as fair quotations.”88 
Hence, the question the court posed was essentially: Was the use fair, 
or was it of a character that it infringed the copyright holder’s rights? 
This formulation suggests that fairness and infringement are mutually 
exclusive, each representing the absence of the other. After 
formulating the issue in this manner, the court observed: “Difficult 
though it be to make proof, still the complainant is not entitled to any 
decree, unless he proves infringement, as alleged, to the satisfaction 
of the court, as the burden in that issue is always upon the party 
making the charge.”89 The fact that the court pointed out that the 
burden of proving infringement lies with the copyright holder 
immediately after suggesting that infringement is the absence of 
fairness further suggests that the burden to prove infringement 
consists of showing the absence of fairness.90 Thus, the court’s 
reference to fair use as the opposite of infringement and then its 
                                                                                                                 
84 See Christina Bohannan, Copyright Infringement and Harmless Speech, 61 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1083, 1131 (2010) (footnote omitted) (“[B]ecause Folsom did not create a fair use defense 
as such, but rather redefined the test of infringement, Folsom arguably would have required the 
copyright holder to bear the burden of proof on the issue of harm as part of the burden to prove 
infringement.”). But see John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law 
Copyright, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 483 (2005) (“Under Folsom and its progeny, once the 
copyright holder made a prima facie showing that the alleged infringer borrowed the protected 
work, the burden then shifted to the alleged infringer to demonstrate that his use was 
excusable.”). 
85 Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 56, 60 (stating that the burden is on the charging party). 
86 Id. at 60 (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)). 
87 Id. at 56. 
88 Id. at 59. 
89 Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
90 See id. (implying that such use is either fair or infringing on a copyright holder’s right, 
and then placing the burden on the copyright holder to prove an infringement). 
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immediate statement that the copyright holder always bears a burden 
to prove infringement suggests that the Lawrence court viewed the 
copyright holder as bearing a burden to prove that a use was not 
fair.91 
Simms v. Stanton92 is another early fair-use case that indicates that 
copyright holders had a burden to prove that the use was unfair.93 
After opining that Justice Story best articulated the test for piracy, the 
court acknowledged the uncertainty that surrounds some questions of 
fair use.94 The court then stated that although the copyright holder had 
made a strong showing against the user, he had failed to satisfy his 
burden of proof. In the court’s words:  
While the respondent candidly admits that she consulted 
complainant’s works in preparing and writing her own, and 
while the excerpts or parallelisms tend to show that she 
borrowed from complainant's books, and in several instances 
certainly approached very closely to the line that marks the 
boundary between a fair and an illegitimate use, still I think, 
upon the whole of the case, that the complainant, on whom 
the burden of proof lies, has failed to show such substantial 
piracy on the part of respondent as would entitle him to relief 
in a court of equity.95 
In no uncertain terms, the court ruled for the defendant-user on the 
basis that the copyright holder had failed to satisfy his burden of 
proving that the use was unfair. 
                                                                                                                 
91 A review of the pleadings of such early American cases does not shed light on which 
litigant bore the burden of proof. The early fair-use cases in the United States all arose in 
equitable proceedings, and to prevail in equity, a copyright holder must have pleaded that the 
defendant’s act has caused harm. See generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: 
DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.1(1), at 50 (2 ed. 1993) (“[E]quity would not grant a 
remedy for a legal right unless, without the equitable remedy, the plaintiff would suffer 
irreparable harm.”). So the fact that a copyright holder pleaded that a defendant’s use of the 
copyrighted material caused harm by substituting for the copyright holder’s work does not 
imply that as an action at law the copyright holder would bear a burden to make that showing in 
order to prevail on a claim for infringement. See, e.g., Bill in Equity at 18–19, Lawrence v. 
Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (alleging harm caused by defendant’s use 
of the copyright holder’s material to supersede copyright holder’s work). That said, language 
that the copyright holder used in his bill in equity in Lawrence suggests that he needed to 
demonstrate that the use was not fair according to the principles outlined in Folsom. See id. at 
18 (alleging that defendant’s book “is and was intended to be a competing book with [the books 
of the copyright holder] . . . [and intended] to supersede and take the place of said books”). 
92 75 F. 6 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896). 
93 See id. at 13 (holding that complainant failed to meet his burden of proof). 
94 See id. at 9–10 (“Probably the most accurate, and at the same time concise, statement of 
the test of piracy is that laid down by Mr. Circuit Justice Story . . . . What constitutes a ‘fair use’ 
is often a very difficult question to answer. What would be a ‘fair use’ in one case might not be 
in another.”). 
95 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
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Additional language suggesting that copyright holders bear a 
burden of proof on the issue of fair use arises in Greene v. Bishop.96 
There, the court noted that “[g]reat difficulties” surround the inquiry 
into whether copying from an original author “amounts to piracy”, or 
alternatively, whether the use “does not exceed what the law 
permits.”97 The court then explained that “if so much is taken that the 
value of the original is sensibly and materially diminished, or the 
labors of the original author are substantially to an injurious extent 
appropriated by another . . . such taking or appropriation is sufficient 
in point of law to maintain the suit.”98 The court therefore framed the 
infringement issue in terms of the use being unfair, and pointed out 
that it is from that standpoint that the copyright holder maintains the 
suit.  
It seems clear, then, that the early cases indicate a burden on the 
copyright holder to demonstrate an unfair use in order to show 
infringement. But it is not immediately clear whether that burden 
would give much advantage to users. It may be questioned whether a 
burden of proof affects the fair-use analysis at all: today courts treat 
the issue of fair use as a pure matter of law where the underlying 
historical facts are undisputed.99 As an issue of law that judges 
usually decide at summary judgment, a litigant’s burden of proof 
would not seem to affect how a court chooses to apply or not apply 
fair use. But this was not always so. In years previous, fair use was 
not an issue of law unaffected by any burden of proof; it was instead 
an issue of fact subject to that burden.100 Only in recent years have 
some courts changed their treatment of fair use from issue of fact to 
issue of law.101 So in the past, when the issue of fairness was an issue 
of fact, the burden was very relevant.102 Moreover, some modern 
                                                                                                                 
96 10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763). 
97 Id. at 1134. 
98 Id. 
99 See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 
1998) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the copyright holder on the 
issue of fair use where no “genuine issues of material fact” existed); Snow, supra 19, at 539–42 
(criticizing courts for treating issues of fair use as pure issues of law). 
100 See Snow, supra 19, at 518–27 (arguing fair use was always a question of fact unless 
the suit was in courts of equity). 
101 See id. at 528–34 (noting the frequency of courts since 1980 disregarding the common 
law concerns against deciding fair use issues on summary judgment). 
102 See, e.g., Lillard v. Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n, 87 F. 213, 213–14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1898) (noting apparent impossibility for rights-holder to show market harm and thereby 
concluding that use is fair); Farmer v. Elstner, 33 F. 494, 497 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888) (analyzing 
whether defendant’s use is fair and noting “the absence of testimony showing that plaintiff has 
been, or is likely to be, injured by defendants' publication”). In Emerson v. Davis, 8 F. Cas. 615 
(D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436), Justice Story examined whether a defendant had pirated the 
copyright holder’s work in imitating that work. His opinion sheds light on the issue of burden of 
proof: 
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courts—although not all—still treat fair use as raising a factual issue 
for the jury.103 And it is possible that courts will yet recognize the 
error in treating fair use as a pure matter of law.104 
This history of courts treating fair use as definitional to 
infringement, with a burden on the copyright holder to show an unfair 
use, continued into the 1900s. Language from West Publishing Co. v. 
Edward Thompson Co.105 is illustrative: 
If infringement and unfair use of such a [work] be shown, an 
injunction would be the only appropriate remedy . . . .  
. . . . 
The complainant has raised the question of unfair use; that is, 
of infringement . . . .  
. . . . 
In addition to copying, it must be shown that this has been 
done to an unfair extent. It is only after copying has been 
shown that the question of fair or unfair use arises, and then it 
is controlling.106 
The court thus viewed fair use as determining infringement, thereby 
requiring the copyright holder to make a showing that the use was 
unfair.107 Similarly, the court in Solomon v. R. K. O. Radio Pictures, 
Inc.108 expressed the copyright holder’s burden: “[T]here was no 
                                                                                                                 
 
It is not sufficient to show, that [Defendant’s work] may have been suggested by [the 
copyright holder’s work], or that some parts and pages of it have resemblances, in 
method and details and illustrations, to [the copyright holder’s]. It must be further 
shown, that the resemblances in those parts and pages are so close, so full, so 
uniform, so striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion that the one is a substantial 
copy of the other, or mainly borrowed from it. 
Id. at 622. 
103 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277–78 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (finding that the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence); DC 
Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four factors listed in 
Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”). 
104 See generally Snow, supra note 19 (arguing that courts should treat fair use as an issue 
of fact). 
105 169 F. 833 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1909). 
106 Id. at 844, 861 (emphasis added). The quoted language constitutes a statement of the 
relevant law by the defendant’s lawyer, regarding “What Constitutes Infringement of 
Copyright.” Id. at 861. The court characterized the quoted language as “a correct deduction of 
the law.” Id. at 862. 
107 See id. (noting that “the determination of the questions of fact raised by [fair use] will 
substantially determine the [infringement] questions at issue”). 
108 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). 
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substantial copying which would warrant a holding of unfair use or 
actionable infringement. The plaintiff having failed to sustain the 
burden of proof, judgment is rendered in favor of the defendants.”109 
Into the middle of the twentieth century, fair use determined whether 
a copyright holder’s rights had been infringed, defining the scope of a 
copyright holder’s rights.110 
B. Judicial Departure from Precedent 
1. A Mistake by Two Commentators 
Despite the fact that courts framed fair use as a doctrine that 
defined copyright, one early commentator suggested that fair use was 
a doctrine that excused infringement that had already occurred.111 In 
his 1925 treatise on copyright, Richard DeWolf opined that fair use 
exists because copyright holders tacitly consent to those uses.112 
DeWolf argued that the copyright holder’s creation of a work implied 
his tacit consent to foreseen uses of the work, which meant that those 
uses would be infringing without the tacit consent.113 And, according 
to DeWolf, copyright restricted even fair uses absent the tacit consent 
                                                                                                                 
109 Id. at 782; see also Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 64, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) 
(discussing fair use as a doctrine of infringement, as distinct from the affirmative defenses that 
the defendant pleaded). 
110 Early fair-use cases often combined what today are the distinct doctrines of substantial 
similarity, improper appropriation, and fair use. Treatment of any of these terms in an earlier 
case suggests that courts viewed that treatment as applicable to all such doctrines. See, e.g., 
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946) (declaring an essential element of 
copyright holder’s case to be establishing that defendant’s copying constitutes improper 
appropriation, in contrast to permissible copying, and relying on Folsom to support a doctrine of 
permissible copying, i.e., fair use); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 
1946) (“[P]laintiff, to make out his case, must establish . . . that, if copying is proved, it . . . 
constitute[s] unlawful appropriation.”).  
Although cases did not always speak to a burden, they often indicated that fair use 
determined whether the defendant had infringed a copyright, which implied that the copyright 
holder had the burden because the general burden to show infringement rests with the copyright 
holder. See, e.g., Am. Inst. of Architects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146, 147–48 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 
(“[T]he defendant’s use was not the kind of use intended to be forbidden by the statute and does 
not constitute an infringement.”); Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 
818 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (“I have come to the conclusion that in publishing the portion of the song 
‘Poor Pauline’, there was no infringement, and that the publication was a ‘fair use’ and 
permissible and not contrary to law.”). 
111 See RICHARD C. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925) (arguing fair 
use merely excuses a copyright infringement). 
112 Id. (“‘[F]air use’ strictly speaking . . . is a use technically forbidden by the law, but 
allowed as reasonable and customary, on the theory that the author must have foreseen it and 
tacitly consented to it.”). 
113 See id. (suggesting that the copyright holder anticipates a degree of copying pre-
publication). 
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of copyright holders.114 Under DeWolf’s conception, fair use does not 
represent a right of speech that competes with the right of copyright; 
rather, fair use represents a copyright holder’s tacit choice to forbear 
the exercise of his rights.115 In contrast to earlier fair-use decisions, 
DeWolf’s conception of the fair-use doctrine did not define 
infringement; it excused it.116 
Tellingly, DeWolf did not cite any legal commentators or courts 
for his conception of fair use.117 And a search of relevant authority at 
the time of DeWolf reveals little to no support for his conception of 
the doctrine. Only one case could support DeWolf’s proposition that 
fair use arises from tacit or implied consent of a copyright holder.118 
The court in Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co. 
explained, in dicta, that unauthorized uses may be permissible based 
on the “implied consent” of a copyright holder, which arises from the 
customary practice of his trade.119 The court further explained, 
however, that society as a whole—through common consent—
compels copyright holders’ consent.120 Thus, even Sampson does not 
appear consistent with DeWolf’s conception that in the absence of 
consent, fair users infringe. Rather, the Sampson court’s reference to 
fair use by common consent suggests that in the absence of consent, a 
                                                                                                                 
114 See id. (arguing that fair use was “technically forbidden by law”). 
115 See id. (claiming that a part of publication is an understanding others may appropriate 
work in some instancing without prior approval). 
116 See id. (describing fair use as technically forbidden, yet customary and acceptable). 
117 Id. 
118 See Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 540–41 (1st Cir. 
1905) (raising a similar argument to DeWolf’s). 
119 Id. The Sampson court considered whether a defendant who had published portions of 
the copyright holder’s city directory made a fair use of that directory. Id. at 539. Although the 
court found infringement, the court explained (in dicta) that under some circumstances a 
subsequent publisher may use identical expression of an earlier publication based on the prior 
publisher’s implied consent. Id. at 540–41. Prior publishers, according to the court, impliedly 
consented to uses of their expression where the subsequent use advanced the subject of their 
expression. Id. The court inferred that implied consent from the fact that all publishers gave 
their common consent to such usage: customary practice dictated consent to build upon the 
original expression. Id. 
Sampson’s description of implied consent based on customary practice is dubitable. At 
that time, several courts and at least one commentator expressly rejected the idea that fair use 
arose from implied consent of a rights-holder through customary practice of a trade. See Walter 
v. Steinkopff, (1892) 3 Ch. 489, 499 (rejecting defendant’s argument that custom of quotation 
justified copying); Maxwell v. Somerton, (1874) 22 W.L.R. 313 at 314 (recognizing 
infringement despite general customary practice of provincial papers); Wyatt v. Barnard, (1814) 
35 Eng. Rep. 408, 408 (Ch.) (rejecting argument that usual practices among publishers could 
control the law); E.J. MACGILLIVRAY, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE DOMINIONS OF THE CROWN, AND IN THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 102–03 (1902) (“Custom of Trade has been pleaded in defence of what was otherwise 
clearly a piracy. . . . It is clear that no such customs can be admitted.”).  
120 See Sampson, 140 F. at 541 (“[B]y the common consent . . . subsequent authors are 
sometimes entitled, and indeed, required, to make use of what precedes them in the precise form 
in which last exhibited . . . .”).  
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rights-holder would hold no rights, so no one could infringe.121 
DeWolf’s conception of fair use does not appear to accurately portray 
how courts of his time treated the doctrine.122  
Albeit mistaken, DeWolf’s interpretation of fair use—as a 
technically infringing use that is based on the implied consent of a 
rights-holder—found its way into a 1944 copyright treatise by a well 
known commentator, Horace Ball.123 Relying on the only case that 
had adopted DeWolf’s faulty characterization (in dicta),124 Ball 
proclaimed: “Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright.”125 
Like DeWolf, Ball described fair use as a privilege that arises from 
the implied consent of a copyright holder:126  
Although the Copyright Law makes no provision for ‘fair 
use’ of another’s work, the author’s consent to a reasonable 
use of his copyrighted works has always been implied . . . . 
As a doctrine that arises from the implied consent of copyright 
holders, fair use—according to Ball—excuses, rather than defines, 
infringing conduct. Only because the author impliedly consents does 
the infringing conduct go unpunished; hence, Ball preached that 
“[f]air use is technically an infringement of copyright.”127 
That Ball’s description is mistaken becomes evident when 
examining the caselaw that he relied on for it—Lawrence v. Dana.128 
                                                                                                                 
121 See id. at 544–45 (discussing the implied consent that a copyright holder gives to users 
and its limitations). 
122 DeWolf’s understanding of fair use was analogous to the affirmative defense of implied 
consent in a real-property trespass case. Cf. Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256 
A.D.2d 131, 131 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that implied consent in an affirmative defense to 
an action for real property trespass). By contrast, the way that the Sampson court conceived fair 
use was analogous to the rights of an easement holder over a servient estate holder, where the 
servient estate holder has received the estate subject to an existing fair-use easement. Cf. 
Shooting Point, LLC v. Wescoat, 576 S.E.2d 497, 502 (Va. 2003) (“A party alleging that a 
particular use of an easement is unreasonably burdensome has the burden of proving his 
allegation.”). 
123 See HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944) 
(“Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that 
the appropriation is reasonable and customary.”). 
124 See Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S. Pat. Q. 40, 42 
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (citing DeWolf’s claim that authors implicitly consent to all use that were 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of production). 
125 BALL, supra note 123, at 240. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 260 nn.1–2 (citing Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 
8,136)). In addition to Lawrence v. Dana, Ball cited five other cases to support his definition of 
fair use as a technical infringement predicated on the implied consent of the rights-holder. See 
id. at 260 nn.2–3, 5. Of those five, only one supports his view, Shapiro, 26 U.S. Pat. Q. at 42, 
where the court quoted DeWolf’s description of fair use in dicta. Three of the others do not, see 
Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (finding that copyright does not protect 
“common property” such as plotlines but protects literary elements added to the plotline); Story 
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In Lawrence, the court repeatedly referred to fair use as a privilege.129 
Ball appears to have seized upon that privilege language to describe 
fair use as a sort of implied-consent privilege,130 analogous to the 
implied-consent privilege in real property law.131 The Lawrence 
court, however, attached a broader meaning to privilege than did 
Ball.132 According to the Lawrence court, the fair-use privilege arose 
because a fair user created expression—not because the copyright 
holder had consented to the use.133 More precisely, the Lawrence 
court explained that a general privilege protects creators of 
expression, but copyright limits the privilege where the copied 
expression substitutes for the original. That is, copyright limits the 
general privilege of expression to its core, i.e., fair use. So Lawrence 
represents copyright as an exception to the general privilege of 
expression, and fair use as the core of that privilege which copyright 
may not restrict.134 Ball, on the other hand, employed the word 
                                                                                                                 
 
v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) (relying upon Folsom v. 
Marsh to declare fair use is not an infringement if it does not supersede the purpose of or act as 
a substitute for the original work); Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 271–72 
(Ch.) (relying upon plaintiff’s absence of damage to the plaintiff to deny preliminary 
injunction), and, as discussed infra in this section, one is questionable, see Sampson & Murdock 
Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 539–40 (1st Cir. 1905) (holding “it clearly was not the 
implied intention” of the plaintiff to allow the defendant to copy portions of the plaintiff’s 
directory).  
Further evidence that the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use was mistaken is apparent 
from another commentator’s opinion at about the same time as Horace Ball. Professor Melville 
Nimmer stated: “It is sometimes suggested that fair use is predicated on the implied or tacit 
consent of the author. This is manifestly a fiction, for a restrictive legend on a work prohibiting 
coping in whole or in part gives no greater protection than the copyright notice standing alone.” 
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05, at 13–157 
(Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2011) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
129 See Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136) (describing 
the “privilege conceded to subsequent authors”). 
130 See BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (emphasis added) (“Fair use may be defined as a 
privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent.”). 
131 Cf. St. Louis Cnty. v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (emphases 
added) (“[A] person who enters an area open to the public at a reasonable time and in a 
reasonable manner, has the implied consent of the owner to enter the premises under a limited 
privilege, and as long as the privilege, based upon implied consent, is within the conditional or 
restricted consent of the owner to enter, the implied consent remains.”).  
132 See Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 61 (referring to copyright law as limiting the “privilege of 
fair use accorded to a subsequent writer”). 
133 See id. (noting a book review is a fair use of the original work as long as the review 
does not function as a substitute for the original work). 
134 Early fair use jurisprudence reveals only three other cases where the court employed the 
term “privilege” in describing the doctrine. See Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10–11 (C.C.N.D. 
Cal. 1896) (quoting EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN THE GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 394 (1879)) 
(“She was, therefore, privileged to make a ‘fair use’ . . . . ‘The fair uses . . . which an author is 
privileged to make of a copyrighted work . . . .’”); Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 
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privilege to suggest that fair use exists as an exception to the 
otherwise superior right of copyright, where the exception is based on 
a copyright holder’s implied consent to excuse infringing conduct. 
This was not the meaning of privilege that the Lawrence court 
articulated. 
The DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use suggests that uncertainty 
disfavors the application of fair use. Under their conception of fair 
use as a technical infringement of copyright, fair use constitutes an 
exception to a norm. And that characteristic of exceptionality 
suggests that it should not apply unless warranted. So the norm 
becomes copyright enforcement; the exception becomes fair use as an 
excuse of infringement. Given that a proponent of an exception must 
demonstrate that the exception should apply, fair users—under the 
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use—must demonstrate that fair use 
applies. And uncertainty inhibits that demonstration. Subtle but 
distinct, a new paradigm of fair use arose out of two commentators’ 
mistake. 
2. Judicial Adoption of the Mistake 
A consequence of this paradigm shift was that courts ceased 
treating fair use as an element of infringement, instead treating it as 
an affirmative defense. Once courts accepted the paradigm shift, the 
change to affirmative defense was only natural: an affirmative 
defense excuses a defendant from liability where the defendant’s 
conduct would otherwise be infringing; if certain facts have occurred, 
the affirmative defense excuses liability.135 The DeWolf-Ball 
conception of fair use as a doctrine that excuses infringement based 
on the implied consent of copyright holders thus implicitly suggests 
                                                                                                                 
 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (“[N]or can the privilege be so exercised as to supersede the 
original [work].”); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) 
(“[T]his privilege can not be so exercised as to supersede the original [work].”). All are 
consistent with the broad meaning that the court employed in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. at 
61. 
135 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1270, at 558 (3d ed. 2004) (explaining that an affirmative defense derives from the common 
law plea of “confession and avoidance,” which permitted a defendant who was willing to admit 
the plaintiff’s declaration of the prima facie case and then allege additional new material that 
would defeat the plaintiff’s otherwise valid cause of action and excuse the defendant’s conduct); 
see e.g., Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningside Dev., LLC, 284 F.3d 505, 514 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(“The existence of an implied nonexclusive license . . . constitutes an affirmative defense to an 
allegation of copyright infringement.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 482 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining affirmative defense as the “defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, 
will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are 
true.”). 
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that fair use is an affirmative defense, much like the affirmative 
defense of consent in real property law.136 One practical consequence 
of treating fair use as an affirmative defense is that the fair user must 
prove all facts necessary to prevail on the affirmative defense.137 
Unlike a defense, which does not require defendants to bear a burden 
of proof,138 an affirmative defense usually places the proof burden on 
the defendant.139 So prior to Ball, if a court ever referred to fair use as 
a defense, the court was not suggesting that the burden of proof lie 
with the defendant.140 Courts that relied on Ball’s treatise, however, 
treated fair use as a doctrine that excused infringing conduct, and so 
they viewed it as an affirmative defense—one that placed the burden 
of proof on the defendant.141 They accordingly placed the burden of 
proof on the fair user. Now bearing the burden of proof, fair users 
faced a formidable challenge given the inherent uncertainty 
surrounding whether any particular use is fair. Uncertainty now 
favored copyright rather than fair use. Thus, as courts bought into the 
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use, they implicitly began treating fair 
use as inferior to copyright.142 
                                                                                                                 
136 Cf. Stukes v. Bachmeyer, 249 S.W.3d 461, 465 n.1 (Tex. App. 2007) (commenting in 
real property action that a “defendant has the burden of proof to show consent or authorized use 
and must plead consent as an affirmative defense”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 167 
cmt. c (1965) (noting that party relying on possessor’s consent to entry upon real property bears 
the burden of proving that fact). 
137 See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The 
burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense.”).  
138 A defense is simply an asserted reason for which the plaintiff has no valid case. See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1355, at 482 (referring to a doctrine as a defense does 
not necessarily indicate that the defendant bears the burden of proof); see also, e.g., Duke v. 
Duckworth, 236 F. App’x. 86, 88 (5th Cir. 2007) (referring to qualified immunity as defense 
and then specifying that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof once the defendant has pleaded it 
in good faith); Yellow Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 
928 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen a defendant raises the defense of genericness in an infringement 
case involving an unregistered mark, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to show that the mark 
is valid and not generic.”); Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 101 n.6 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Once the defense has been raised, then the plaintiff must sustain its burden of proof 
. . . .”); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense which 
demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative defense.”); 
Cowen Co. v. Houck Mfg. Co., 249 F. 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1918) (“It sometimes happens that a 
positive defense may properly be introduced under a general denial, in which case the burden of 
proof is still upon the plaintiff . . . .”).  
139 See, e.g., Chi. Bd. of Educ., 354 F.3d at 629. 
140 See, e.g., Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (referring to 
fair use as a defense). 
141 See, e.g., Loew’s Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165, 167, 174 (S.D. 
Cal. 1955) (quoting from Ball’s treatise and referring to fair use as an affirmative defense), aff'd 
sub nom., Benny v. Loew’s Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aff’d sub nom. by an equally 
divided court, Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew’s, Inc. 356 U.S. 43 (1958). 
142 See, e.g., id. and cases cited infra note 148 (noting courts that treated fair use as an 
affirmative defense). 
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Further history on fair use’s development into an affirmative 
defense is revealing. The first court to label fair use as an affirmative 
defense—a California district court—did so in 1955, a decade after 
Ball published his treatise.143 Tellingly, that first court quoted from 
Ball’s treatise, characterizing fair use as “technically an infringement 
of copyright.”144 Two more courts labeled fair use an affirmative 
defense during the 1960s,145 and three during the 1970s.146 All were 
district courts, and none of those district courts—or for that matter 
any court ever—provided any reasoned support or analysis for their 
labeling fair use as an affirmative defense. They did not indicate that 
they were breaking from the judicial practice of treating fair use as 
definitional to infringement. Instead, they merely noted its availability 
as an affirmative defense in passing when introducing the fair-use 
argument. It was as though the courts did not realize that they were 
departing from historical precedent. And likely they did not. All were 
likely viewing fair use through the framework of Ball, most citing to 
the very page of Ball’s treatise on which he described fair use as a 
privilege excusing infringement.147 Assuming that those courts 
believed that Ball—a well-respected commentator—correctly stated 
the law of fair use, they would not have realized that they were 
departing from the original conception of fair use by labeling it an 
affirmative defense. The judicial creation of fair use as an affirmative 
defense was a natural consequence of Ball’s faulty characterization, 
and as a result, that judicial creation appears to have been an 
unintentional mistake. 
                                                                                                                 
143 See Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 167 (listing fair use as one of the affirmative defenses the 
defendant set forth). 
144 Id. at 174. 
145 See Trebonik v. Grossman Music Corp., 305 F. Supp. 339, 341 (N.D. Ohio 1969) 
(listing fair use as one of the defendant’s affirmative defenses); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis 
Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same). 
146 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 
351, 355 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (noting that the defendants raised the affirmative defense of fair use); 
Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) 
(noting that “fair use has been recognized as a valid affirmative defense”); Rohauer v. Killiam 
Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723, 730, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing Ball and deeming fair use an 
affirmative defense), rev’d, 551 F.2d 484, (2d Cir. 1977); see also Encyclopaedia Britannica 
Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 251 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (“[T]he burden of establishing 
fair use is on the defendant . . . .”). 
147 See Meredith, 378 F. Supp. at 689 n.11 (relying on Ball’s treatise for its conception of 
fair use); Rohauer, 379 F. Supp. at 732 (same); Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 174 (same). 
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C. Congressional Intent as Speech Right 
1. Legislative History Prior to the Copyright Act 
After the first court (the 1955 California district court) labeled fair 
use an affirmative defense—but before any other courts did—
Congress considered the issue of whether fair use was a presumptive 
right or an affirmative defense. In 1967, a House Judiciary Committee 
considered legislation that eventually became the 1976 Copyright 
Act.148 The 1967 House Report stated only the following sentence 
regarding which litigant should bear the fair-use burden of proof: 
“The committee believes that any special statutory provision placing 
the burden of proving fair use on one side or the other would be 
unfair and undesirable.”149 The Committee thus considered it 
undesirable for Congress to speak on the issue, suggesting that the 
Committee saw no reason to alter the status quo.150 That fact is 
significant because at the time of this statement in 1967, only the 
California district court had labeled fair use an affirmative defense—
hardly sufficient to constitute a status quo.151 The Committee’s advice 
to remain silent suggests that in 1967, the Committee did not 
recognize any need to depart from the then-existent judicial practice 
of presuming fair use by placing the burden with copyright holders. 
Nine years after that 1967 Report, Congress enacted the 1976 
Copyright Act.152 By that time, the law surrounding the status of fair 
use as a presumptive right and the burden-of-proof issue had become 
unsettled.153 So the Committee’s advice that Congress should remain 
silent on the issue became obsolete by the time Congress acted. It was 
therefore necessary for Congress to break its silence on the issue, and 
so Congress did. Through several provisions of the Act, Congress 
expressed a clear intent on the issue.154 
                                                                                                                 
148 H.R. REP. NO. 90–83 (1967). 
149 Id. at 37. 
150 See id. (stating no statutory provision related to the fair-use burden of proof is 
necessary).  
151 See Loew’s, 131 F. Supp. at 167. 
152 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1301 (2006)).  
153 See cases cited supra notes 141, 145 and 146 (discussing courts treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense). 
154 See Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative, 54 J. 
COPYRIGHT. SOC’Y 139, 139–40 (2007) (“[W]ith the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act the 
right of fair use cannot be considered an affirmative defense—either logically or doctrinally.”). 
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2. Language of the Copyright Act 
The most apparent indication of congressional intent on the issue 
appears in the Act’s fair-use provision, section 107.155 Section 107 
articulates the doctrine as the original fair-use jurisprudence portrays 
it—a doctrine that defines infringement:156 “[T]he fair use of a 
copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”157 
Expressly, then, Congress rejected the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair 
use as a doctrine that excused technically infringing uses.158 Fair use 
cannot be “technically an infringement”159 if it “is not an 
infringement.”160 Congress cast aside the DeWolf-Ball conception 
that had caused courts to depart from the original conception of fair 
use as a right. 
The quoted language of the Act—“the fair use of a copyrighted 
work . . . is not an infringement of copyright”—draws a distinct line 
between fair and infringing uses. What is fair is not infringing, and 
what is infringing is not fair. Under the Act, then, fair use is 
definitional to infringement.161 To satisfy his burden to show 
infringement, then, a copyright holder must satisfy the definition of 
infringement—i.e., a use that is not fair. 
Other provisions in the Copyright Act manifest congressional 
intent to treat fair use as a right. Section 108 expressly refers to fair 
                                                                                                                 
155 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 
(11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original) (noting in dicta that “fair use should be considered an 
affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined 
in the Act as a use that is not a violation of copyright”). 
156 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994) (“[F]air use 
remained exclusively judge-made doctrine until the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, in 
which Justice Story’s summary [that he articulated in Folsom v. Marsh] is discernible”). 
157 17 U.S.C. § 107. The full sentence of the quotation reads:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or 
by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
Id. 
158 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (exploring and critiquing the DeWolf-Ball conception 
of fair use). 
159 See BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (“Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright 
. . . .”). 
160 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
161 See PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (describing language of fair use provision in 
Copyright Act as “backward phrasing” in view of the fact that fair use is an affirmative 
defense); David Nimmer, InacCSSibility, in BENJAMIN KAPLAN ET AL., AN UNHURRIED VIEW 
OF COPYRIGHT REPUBLISHED (AND WITH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM FRIENDS) Nimmer–8 (Iris C. 
Geik et al. eds., 2005) (“Congress defined the fair use of a copyrighted work to lie outside the 
rights of the copyright owner . . . . [T]his [fair-use] limitation is every bit as integral as, for 
example, are those section 106 grants.”). 
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use as a right.162 The purpose of that section is to limit the scope of 
copyright as enforced against public libraries and archives that 
reproduce non-commercial copies.163 Within that section, Congress 
stated: “Nothing in this section . . . in any way affects the right of fair 
use as provided by section 107.”164 Noteworthy is that Congress 
employed the word “right” to describe fair use rather than 
“affirmative defense.”165 Also noteworthy is that Congress employed 
the same word, “right,” to describe that which is held by a copyright 
holder, without providing any indication that the meaning of right is 
any different in any context.166 As the same sort of right held by a 
copyright holder, the fair-use right must compete with the copyright 
right. So by describing fair use as a competing right, Congress 
intimated its intent that fair use define the scope of the copyright 
right, rather than excuse an infringement of the copyright right.167  
3. Organization of the Copyright Act 
Congressional intent is further apparent when viewing the 
Copyright Act as an entire code. The purpose of Chapter 1 is to define 
the subject matter and scope of copyright.168 Individual sections 
within that chapter state the subject matter, the exclusive rights, and 
limitations on those exclusive rights.169 The sections within Chapter 1 
thus serve to define the scope of rights by both setting forth the rights 
and demarcating the limits of those rights. To that end, the sections 
are integral to one other. Indeed, the section that lists copyright’s 
exclusive rights, section 106, qualifies those rights by making them 
“[s]ubject to” all sections within Chapter 1 which provide limitations 
on the rights.170 All sections within Chapter 1 serve to define the 
scope of the copyright rights. 
This structure implies that when Congress placed the fair-use 
provision in section 107 of Chapter 1, Congress intended that the fair-
                                                                                                                 
162 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
163 See id. (providing a section entitled “Limitations on exclusive rights: Reproduction by 
libraries and archives”). 
164 Id. (emphasis added). 
165 See id. at (f)(4) (noting that fair use is a right). 
166 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“‘Copyright owner’, with respect to any one of the exclusive 
rights comprised in a copyright, refers to the owner of that particular right.”). 
167 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 108 (noting that fair use is a right), with 17 U.S.C. § 101 
(defining copyright owner as holding a right). 
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“Chapter 1 Subject Matter and Scope of Copyright”). 
169 17 U.S.C. §§ 102–18. 
170 17 U.S.C. § 106; see Kenneth D. Crews, Fair Use of Unpublished Works: Burdens of 
Proof and the Integrity of Copyright, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 69 n.363 (1999) (arguing that the 
Copyright Act can be interpreted as providing that fair use is a definitional element of 
copyright’s scope based on “subject to” language of 17 U.S.C. § 106). 
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use provision be an integral part of the rights of copyright holders. 
Congress must have therefore intended that the fair-use provision 
define the scope of a copyright holder’s rights.171 That fair use defines 
the scope of copyright implies that fair use defines infringement, for 
the scope of copyright must be ascertained to determine infringement; 
and by defining infringement, fair use requires the litigant charged 
with demonstrating infringement—the copyright holder—to 
demonstrate that the use is not fair.172 The placement of the fair-use 
provision in Chapter 1 suggests a presumption of fair use.  
4. 1976 Legislative History 
Legislative history also indicates congressional intent to place the 
burden of proof with copyright holders. In a 1976 House Report, the 
Judiciary Committee noted the “established legal principle” that a 
“burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to establish 
facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.”173 This 
principle is well recognized in the law: as stated by Wright and 
Miller, the burden should lie with the party who “has superior access 
to the evidence needed to prove the fact,” in the absence of a 
substantive policy reason otherwise.174 In other words, where the 
burden of production is easier for one of the parties to satisfy because 
of that party’s unique access to evidence, the burden of proof should 
lie with that party.175 
This principle suggests that the burden of proving fair use should 
lie with the copyright holder rather than with the fair user. The 
principle is less relevant for the first three statutory fair-use factors 
                                                                                                                 
171 See Nimmer, supra note 161, at Nimmer–8 (“Congress delineated the rights of 
copyright owners in all of sections 106 through 121. . . . Attention blinkered on section 106 fails 
to discern that [fair use] is every bit as integral as, for example, are those section 106 grants.”); 
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2007) (inferring from the 
fact that the Copyright Act sets forth fair use as a limitation on copyright that the Act “require[s] 
the copyright owner to prove that the defendant’s use exceeded the bounds of fair use in order to 
show infringement”). 
172 Congress did not intend that all sections of Chapter 1 require copyright holders to bear 
the burden of proving their application or non-application. In a 1976 House Report, the 
Judiciary Committee acknowledged that “the burden of proof should not be placed upon a 
litigant to establish facts particularly within the knowledge of his adversary.” H.R. REP. NO. 94–
1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695. Tellingly, evidence suggesting 
the fairness or unfairness of a use is uniquely within the knowledge of the copyright holder. See 
infra Part II.C.4 (explaining rights-holders possess superior access to evidence concerning the 
fourth, and most crucial, factor taken into consideration in infringement cases). 
173 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695 
(emphasis added). The Committee noted this principle in the context of advising courts how to 
apply the first-sale doctrine, as codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109. Id.  
174 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 135, § 5122, at 399–403.  
175 See id. (inferring the burden of proof should rest directly on the party with superior 
access to the required evidence). 
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because evidence is often undisputed relating to those factors.176 But 
the principle is highly relevant to the fourth factor—market impact—
which often weighs heavily in the fair-use analysis.177 The copyright 
holder encounters less difficulty producing evidence of market impact 
than does a fair user.178 The copyright holder has unique access to 
evidence of a use’s effect on the value of, or potential market for, the 
original work.179 As the litigant who owns the work, the copyright 
holder experiences the effects of the defendant’s use. Thus, the 
copyright holder is in the best position to gain access to evidence 
about the market impact of the defendant’s use, i.e., the fourth 
factor.180 The evidentiary principle that the Judiciary Committee 
directed courts to apply in assigning burdens of proof in copyright 
cases suggests that the copyright holder should bear the burden in the 
context of fair use.181 It suggests a presumption of fair use. 
D. Judicial Departure from Congressional Intent 
Nine years after Congress had spoken on the burden of proof, the 
Supreme Court spoke on the issue.182 In Harper & Row Publishers, 
                                                                                                                 
176 See Snow, supra note 19, at 492–93 (explaining that historical facts, which give rise to 
the inferences that determine the first three factors, are usually not disputed). With respect to the 
first three fair-use factors, the burden of production is usually not difficult for either party to 
satisfy. Specifically, the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, 
and the amount and substantiality of the copying all derive from evidence of the defendant’s use 
and from evidence of the original work: evidence of the defendant’s use is not uniquely within a 
defendant’s knowledge, for that evidence led the copyright holder to bring suit; likewise, 
evidence of the original copyrighted work is not uniquely within either party’s knowledge. See 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing the four factors to be taken into consideration in determining “fair 
use”). 
177 Supreme Court precedent establishes that the fourth factor weighs heavily in the fair-
use analysis. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted) (“The fourth factor is the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.”); 
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–55 (1984) (relying almost 
exclusively on fourth factor to determine that use is fair); see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: 
Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1800–01 (2010) (discussing 
the relative inability for fair users to demonstrate the absence of market harm in fair-use 
analysis).  
178 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, § 13.05[A][4], at 13–198.7 (“[S]evere problems of 
proof can attend evidence on the fourth factor . . . .”). 
179 Cf. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1271, 1309 (2008) (“[D]efendants may lack access, at reasonable cost, to evidence relevant to 
some of the fair use factors, and therefore would tend to lose if they bore the burden of proof.”). 
180 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 13.05[A][4] (noting comparative advantage of 
copyright holder over defendant to gain information relating to the market-impact factor). 
181 See  H.R. REP. NO. 94–1476, at 81 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5695 
(“[T]he burden of proof should not be placed upon a litigant to establish facts particularly within 
the knowledge of his adversary.”). 
182 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) 
(requiring a case-by-case analysis that precluded categorical presumptions of fairness, thus 
placing the burden of proof on fair users). 
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Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,183 the Court considered whether the fair-
use doctrine protected the defendant-user who had published an 
article revealing portions of President Ford’s memoirs before his 
memoirs were released.184 Relevant to the burden-of-proof discussion, 
the defendant-user argued that uses of copyrighted material for news 
purposes should be presumptively fair.185 The Court rejected this 
argument by explaining that each case requires case-by-case analysis, 
which precludes categorical presumptions of fairness.186  
But the Court did not stop there. In the same sentence, the Court 
declared fair use to be an affirmative defense, which would require its 
proponent—the user—to prove its application.187 In one sentence, 
then, fair use became an affirmative defense.188 Immediately 
thereafter, all fair users were required to prove their fair use. And fair 
use’s inherent ambiguity served to prosecute rather than protect fair 
users. Through a single sentence, the Court stripped fair use of its 
centuries-old status as a doctrine that represented the speech rights of 
subsequent authors.  
The Harper Court’s declaration that fair use constitutes an 
affirmative defense is especially troubling because the Court 
represented that this was Congress’s intent.189 But as the above 
section demonstrates, that is simply not true.190 Rather tellingly, the 
only citation that the Court provided for its declaration that Congress 
“structured the [fair-use] provision as an affirmative defense” was to 
a page in a 1967 House Report—drafted nearly a decade before the 
Copyright Act was enacted—that contained only one statement 
regarding the burden of proof.191 That statement was the following: 
“any special statutory provision placing the burden of proving fair use 
on one side or the other would be unfair and undesirable.”192 
Certainly this does not mean that Congress intended fair use to be an 
                                                                                                                 
183 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
184 Id. at 542. 
185 Id. at 561. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 See id. (“The drafters resisted pressures from special interest groups to create 
presumptive categories of fair use, but structured the provision as an affirmative defense 
requiring a case-by-case analysis.”). 
189 Id. In addition to the cited sentence, the Court relied on one commentator, William 
Patry, who pointed out that prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act, some courts had placed 
the burden of proof on the defendant. See PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (stating fair use was an 
affirmative defense under the 1909 Copyright Act). For a discussion of these prior courts that 
had placed the burden on defendants, see supra Part II.B. 
190 See supra Part II.C (explaining the Judiciary Committee’s advocated evidentiary 
principle suggested that copyright holders should bear the burden of proof in fair use cases). 
191 Harper, 471 U.S. at 561 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90–83, at 37 (1967)). 
192 H.R. REP. NO. 90–83, at 37 (1967). 
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affirmative defense when it passed the Copyright Act. Conspicuously 
absent from Harper, then, is any support for construing fair use as an 
affirmative defense. 
Why, then, did the Harper Court portray fair use as an affirmative 
defense? The answer may lie in the framework through which the 
Court viewed fair use—that of Horace Ball. The Court quoted Ball’s 
definition of fair use—a technical infringement that is excused 
because of the implied consent of a copyright holder.193 As discussed 
above, Ball’s framework suggests that fair use is an affirmative 
defense rather than a right.194 So Ball’s faulty definition appears to 
have influenced the Harper Court’s conception of fair use, similar to 
prior decisions where courts first began labeling fair use as an 
affirmative defense.195 The Court’s conclusion that fair use is an 
affirmative defense is thus not surprising: the conclusion inheres in 
the very framework through which the Court was viewing fair use—
that of Ball. 
The Harper Court’s terse declaration that fair use was an 
affirmative defense soon settled the burden-of-proof issue. In 1992, 
Congress amended the Copyright Act and in the legislative history of 
that amendment, the Judiciary Committee relied on the Harper 
Court’s declaration to pronounce that “fair use is an affirmative 
defense,” such that “the burden of proving fair use is always on the 
party asserting the defense.”196 Two years later, the Court in 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc,197 again tersely declared fair use 
to be an affirmative defense, relying on its prior statement from 
Harper and the cited 1992 legislative history.198 As in Harper, the 
1992 Judiciary Committee and the Campbell Court both failed to 
provide any substantive analysis in labeling fair use an affirmative 
defense.199 Despite the historical underpinnings of the fair-use 
doctrine and the language of the Copyright Act, courts could no 
longer treat fair use as a right.  
                                                                                                                 
193 See Harper, 471 U.S. at 548–50 (relying on Ball to define fair use and stating that the 
copying at issue “would constitute infringement unless excused as fair use” and that “the fair 
use doctrine was predicated on the author’s implied consent”). 
194 See supra Part II.B (indicating Ball’s characterization of fair use was a misconception). 
195 See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial adoption of 
Ball’s formulation of fair use).  
196 H.R. REP. NO. 102–836, at 3 & n.3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2554 
& n.3. 
197 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
198 Id. at 590 & n.20. 
199 Cf. PATRY, supra note 13, at 585 (describing in five sentences how fair use came to be 
an affirmative defense, ultimately pointing to bald statements by the Supreme Court that lack 
any reasoned analysis). 
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III. THE PRESENT TREATMENT 
Courts today presume infringement rather than fairness. Treating 
fair use as an affirmative defense, courts require fair users to 
demonstrate that their use should be protected.200 There is neither 
discussion nor analysis about whether fair use should be either a 
presumptive right or an exceptional excuse—it is always the latter.201 
Compared to its past status as a right, fair use has weakened 
significantly. This weakness is manifest in judicial reasoning that is 
based on the DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use, in the failure of 
courts to recognize the speech nature of fair use, and in the procedural 
burden that fair users face to prove their non-infringement. Each of 
these manifestations of weakness is illustrated below. 
A. Judicial Reasoning Under the DeWolf-Ball Conception 
As discussed above, the Copyright Act expressly rejects the 
DeWolf-Ball conception of fair use as a technically infringing 
right.202 Yet courts continue to employ that conception, which has 
given rise to judicial reasoning that would nearly always prevent any 
fair uses. Consider Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh.203 
There, the defendant-user, Clean Flicks, purchased copies of movies, 
edited the content by removing sex, nudity, profanity, and violence, 
and then sold the edited copies to consumers.204 Clean Flicks always 
purchased an authorized copy for every edited copy that it sold.205  
                                                                                                                 
200 See, e.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(rejecting defendant’s argument that fair use is “a denial of copyright infringement” on grounds 
that fair use is well established as an affirmative defense); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 
354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted) (“The burden of proof is on the copier 
because fair use is an affirmative defense . . . .”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, § 12.11[F], at 12–
217 (footnote omitted) (“[A]s a matter of definition, the defendant bears the burden of proof as 
to all affirmative defenses, which are discussed throughout this treatise. The affirmative defense 
that is most distinctive to the copyright sphere is fair use . . . .”). 
201 It appears that one commentator has noted the change. See Bohannan, supra note 8484, 
at 1131–32 (noting that historically fair use was not construed as an affirmative defense). And 
only one jurist has expressed discomfort with this treatment of fair use, Judge Stanley Birch. See 
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) (Birch, J.) (“I 
believe that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, rather than 
merely an affirmative defense, as it is defined in the Act as a use that is not a violation of 
copyright.”); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (Birch, J.) 
(“Although the traditional approach is to view ‘fair use’ as an affirmative defense, this writer, 
speaking only for himself, is of the opinion that it is better viewed as a right granted by the 
Copyright Act of 1976.”).  
202 See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining fair use is not technically an infringement and thus 
cannot be an infringing right). 
203 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Col. 2006). 
204 Id. at 1238. 
205 Id. 
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Arguing fair use at summary judgment, Clean Flicks did not 
prevail.206 Influential in the court’s analysis was the market-impact 
factor.207 The evidence showed that for every edited copy that Clean 
Flicks distributed to a consumer, an authorized copy of the Studios’ 
movie was purchased on behalf of that consumer, suggesting that 
Clean Flicks’s use resulted in a positive effect on the market for the 
copyrighted material.208  
The court disagreed.209 It interpreted the evidence to infer that 
Clean Flicks’ use did not strengthen the market for the copyrighted 
movies.210 The court based this interpretation on the mistaken 
conception of fair use as articulated by Horace Ball—that fair use 
represents a technically infringing use that is permissible because of 
the copyright holder’s implied consent.211 From this definition, the 
court reasoned that the Studios would never have impliedly consented 
to Clean Flicks’ use: the Studios apparently desired that certain 
persons not consume their movies (i.e., persons who found their 
movies to be morally objectionable), and Clean Flicks’ use enabled 
those persons to consume the movies.212 
Under the court’s reasoning, the additional consumers that Clean 
Flicks introduced into the market for the Studios’ movies did not 
actually have a positive effect on the market for the Studios’ movies. 
For, according to the court, the Studios could determine which 
consumers should be counted in assessing whether Clean Flicks 
strengthened the market.213 That is, the court’s reasoning suggests that 
copyright holders define the relevant consumer pool, such that the 
fourth factor will always militate against a finding of fair use.214 
Moreover, the court’s logic implies that any time a copyright holder 
objects to a use, implied consent would automatically be disproven.215 
                                                                                                                 
206 Id. at 1243. 
207 See id. at 1241–42 (evaluating the market impact factor and stating that “[t]he primary 
argument on the fair use defense is the fourth statutory factor”).  
208 Id. at 1239. 
209 See id. at 1242 (noting that Clean Flicks’s argument was “superficial” because it 
“ignore[d] the intrinsic value of the right to control the content of the copyrighted work”). 
210 Id. 
211 See id. (noting that fair use “is predicated on a theory of an author’s implied consent”).  
212 Id. (“[Fair use] is not applicable here because the infringing parties are exploiting a 
market for movies that is different from what the Studios have released into and for an audience 
the Studios have not sought to reach.”). 
213 See id. (noting that the author’s implied consent was required and thus basing the 
relevant market on the author’s intended market). 
214 Id; see also 4 NIMMER, supra note 128, at § 13.05[A][4], 13–198.4–198.5 (noting that a 
court could define the potential market in a way that would always militate against a finding of 
fair use). 
215 Cf. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(acknowledging that producers of copyrighted work did not intend to enter market for use at 
issue, but finding infringement based on fact that copyright law should “respect” the copyright 
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It would be difficult, if not logically impossible, to prevail on a fair-
use argument under the reasoning of the Clean Flicks court, which 
followed Ball’s conception of fair use. 
B. Failure to Recognize Speech 
If courts treated fair use as a right of speech, they would favor 
defendant-users whenever close calls arose, namely, when one of any 
number of circumstances could tip the balance either way.216 At a 
minimum, close-call cases would never be decided summarily, 
without a factual hearing, in favor of the speech suppressor—the 
copyright holder.217 Yet they are, and routinely so.218  
Consider Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 
Inc.,219 where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
preliminary injunction enjoining defendant-users from publishing a 
book about the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial.220 The book was 
entitled The Cat NOT in the Hat, and it mimicked the famous Dr. 
Seuss story, The Cat in the Hat.221 The Ninth Circuit framed the fair-
use issue as whether the users’ “taking would be excused.”222 The 
court ultimately rejected the fair-use argument, despite the fact that 
the use appeared to make fun of the original Dr. Seuss story (in 
addition to making fun of the O.J. trial).223 Such ridicule suggests that 
                                                                                                                 
 
holder’s choice not to enter that market). 
216 One might argue that copyrighted speech should be afforded the same speech protection 
as fair-use speech. See Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 36–37) (on file with author) (concluding that the tension 
between the Free Speech Clause and copyright is much greater than the tension between the 
Free Speech Clause and fair use). In short, the threat that an erroneous finding of fairness poses 
to the production of copyrighted material is much less than the threat that an erroneous finding 
of infringement poses to the production of fair uses. See id.  
217 See generally Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (placing 
burden of proof on party seeking to suppress expression); Snow, supra note 177, at 1781 (noting 
precedent in various speech contexts requires speech suppressor to satisfy burden to show that 
speech is unprotected). 
218 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding against fair use on summary judgment, yet admitting that “there are 
numerous competing considerations which make this decision a difficult one”), aff’d, 150 F.3d 
132 (2d Cir. 1998). 
219 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997). 
220 Id. at 1406. 
221 Dr. Seuss Enters. Inc. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc. (Dr. Seuss I), 924 F. Supp. 1559, 
1561 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that the rhymes, the illustrations, and the book’s packaging all 
mimicked the distinctive style of Dr. Seuss), aff’d, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).  
222 Dr. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. 
223 See id. at 1403 (citation omitted) (“Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly 
mimic Dr. Seuss’ characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule. . . . Katz and 
Wrinn merely use the Cat’s stove-pipe hat, the narrator (“Dr.Juice”), and the title (The Cat NOT 
in the Hat!) ‘to get attention’ or maybe even ‘to avoid the drudgery in working up something 
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the use is a parody, which is usually protected as speech.224 But the 
court was blind to this nature of the use, refusing to acknowledge the 
humor and criticism that resulted from that use.225 
Noteworthy in Dr. Seuss was the appellate court’s consideration of 
the market-impact factor.226 The court stated: “Since fair use is an 
affirmative defense, [defendant-users] must bring forward favorable 
evidence about relevant markets.”227 And the users did, as best they 
could, arguing that there would be no effect on the copyright holder’s 
market because the content of the two books differed dramatically.228 
Yet the defendant-users could only conjecture about the effect, for 
their book had not yet been published. Conjecture was insufficient. 
The use was inexcusable for the court because the defendant-users 
could not prove that no harm would result.229 The court, then, 
appeared to construe fair use as a doctrine excusing harmless 
infringement—a doctrine analogous to an excused trespass in 
property law.230 The court could not have been construing fair use as 
a doctrine of speech, for if it had, the uncertainty surrounding the 
fourth factor should have favored the defendant-users. 
C. Reliance on the Burden of Proof 
Like the court in Dr. Seuss, other courts reject users’ fair-use 
arguments because of uncertainty surrounding the market-impact 
factor.231 This fact shows not only that courts fail to treat fair use as a 
                                                                                                                 
 
fresh.’”). 
224 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–82 (1994) (“Parody needs 
to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s 
(or collective victims’) imagination. . . . [P]arody can claim legitimacy for some appropriation 
. . . .).  
225 See Dr. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401 (“While [O.J.] Simpson is depicted 13 times in the 
Cat’s distinctively scrunched and somewhat shabby red and white stove-pipe hat, the substance 
and content of The Cat in the Hat is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman 
murders or the O.J. Simpson trial.”). 
226 See id. at 1403 (quotations and citations omitted) (“The fourth fair use factor is the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”). 
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
229 See id. (citation omitted) (concluding that since the defendant-users failed to submit 
evidence about relevant markets by “confining ‘themselves to uncontroverted submissions that 
there was no likely effect on the market for the original,’” they were not entitled to fair use as an 
affirmative defense). 
230 See Biosafe-One, Inc. v. Hawks, 639 F. Supp. 2d 358, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (setting 
forth harm as an element that must be shown to prevail on a claim for trespass to chattel). 
231 See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood (Infinity Broad. II), 150 F.3d 104, 111 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (finding the fourth factor to be “a very close question” but ultimately deciding that it 
tipped toward the copyright holder’s favor because it “has demonstrated at least the potential for 
interference [by the defendant-user] with its inclusion of listen lines as part of its advertising 
package”).  
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doctrine of speech (as in Dr. Seuss), it also shows that courts rely on 
the procedural burden of proof as a means to reject fair use—a burden 
that courts created without justification. That is, the tendency for 
courts to infer infringement from uncertainty, which may surround 
any of the factors, implies that they are relying on a presumption 
against fair use.232 And in view of the uncertain nature of fair use, 
rebutting that presumption often poses a practical impossibility for 
fair users. 
An example of this reliance on the burden of proof arises in 
Infinity Broadcasting Corporation v. Kirkwood.233 The defendant, 
Kirkwood, broadcasted radio programs from different cities via the 
telephone to its telephone customers.234 The copyright holder, 
Infinity, held the copyrights to the broadcasts.235 On summary 
judgment, the district court found Kirkwood’s use to be fair.236 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the 
use constituted infringement.237  
Central to the Second Circuit’s holding was the fourth factor of 
market impact.238 Although Kirkwood had produced evidence that 
Infinity was not in the business of operating commercial telephone 
lines, the Second Circuit was not persuaded that the fourth factor 
favored Kirkwood.239 The Second Circuit expressly pointed out that 
Kirkwood had failed to prove that its use would not affect Infinity’s 
potential to exploit that market.240 Admitting that “the fourth factor is 
a very close question,” the Second Circuit held for Infinity because, 
“considering that Kirkwood bears the burden of showing an absence 
of ‘usurpation’ harm to Infinity,” the fourth factor “tips toward 
Infinity.”241 Kirkwood’s burden of proof, which the court expressly 
pointed out four times, proved to be dispositive in favor of the 
copyright holder.242 Thus, the burden of proof matters. It has 
weakened the strength of fair use.  
                                                                                                                 
232 See generally Snow, supra note 177, at 1800–01 (describing effect of burden of proof in 
judicial decisions with regard to the four-factor analysis). 
233 Infinity Broad. II, 150 F.3d at 111. 
234 Id. at 106. 
235 Id. at 107.  
236 Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood (Infinity I), 965 F. Supp. 553, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
237 Infinity Broad. II, 150 F.3d at 111–12. 
238 See id. at 110–11 (citation omitted) (“Historically, the fourth factor has been seen as 
central to the fair use analysis . . . .”). 
239 Id. at 111. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. 
242 See id. at 109–12 (finding that the first, second, third, and fourth factors of the fair use 
test leans in Infinity’s favor, rather than Kirkwood’s). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has explained what fair use was, what it has become, 
and the lack of reason for its change. Fair use once existed as doctrine 
through which a right of speech was realized. As the means for 
realizing a subsequent speaker’s right of speech, fair use defined the 
scope of a copyright holder’s rights. It was inseparable from the 
examination for copyright infringement, and as a result, a burden of 
proof rested with the copyright holder to show that the use in question 
was unfair. In short, fair use presumptively applied: fair-use speech 
was permissible unless a copyright holder could prove that censorship 
was appropriate.243 Courts treated fair use with as much weight as any 
right of speech, both from a conceptual and procedural standpoint. 
Courts today treat fair use as an excuse for infringing conduct. 
Silence through copyright has become the norm; speech through fair 
use has become the exception.244 As an exception, fair use applies 
only in extraordinary circumstances. It presumptively does not apply: 
the fair user must prove that his speech merits protection.245 Courts 
treat fair use with as much weight as any excuse for trespassory 
conduct in property law—as exceptional and burdensome.246 
The change in the treatment of fair use occurred without any 
reasoned support. Jurisprudence and scholarship are devoid of any 
explanation of why fair use is now an affirmative defense.247 The 
change from right to excuse happened subtly and mistakenly—tracing 
back to two commentators’ misconception.248 In accepting this 
misconception, courts re-framed the issue of fair use merely because 
someone said so.249 The change lacked any foundation in the law. 
                                                                                                                 
243 See supra Part II.A. 
244 See supra Part III. 
245 See supra Part II.B. 
246 Compare Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The 
general standard, however, is clear enough: the fair use copier must copy no more than is 
reasonably necessary . . . . The burden of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative 
defense.”), and BALL, supra note 123, at 260 (“Fair use is technically an infringement of 
copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is reasonable and 
customary. . . . [T]he author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works has always 
been implied . . . .”), with St. Louis Cnty v. Stone, 776 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) 
(“[A] person who enters an area open to the public at a reasonable time and in a reasonable 
manner, has the implied consent of the owner to enter the premises under a limited privilege, 
and as long as the privilege, based upon implied consent, is within the conditional or restricted 
consent of the owner to enter, the implied consent remains.”), and 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trespass § 73 
(2007) (“Consent sufficient to constitute a defense to trespass may be implied from custom, 
usage, or conduct. . . . Consent, as an affirmative defense to a trespass claim, will be implied 
. . . .”). 
247 See supra Part II.B. 
248 See supra Part II.B. 
249 See supra Part II.B, D. 
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